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Analysis of demographic catastrophes shows that, with the exception of perhaps 
only two critical events, they were too weak to influence the growth of human 
population. These results reinforce the conclusion that the concept of the Epoch of 
Malthusian Stagnation, the alleged first stage of growth claimed by the 
Demographic Transition Theory, is not supported by empirical evidence. They 
show that even if we assume that Malthusian positive checks are capable of 
suppressing the growth of population their impact was too weak to create the 
Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation.   
Introduction2 
In the previous publication (Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013a), we have analysed the effects of 
Malthusian positive checks. We have found that the growth rate increases with the increasing 
intensity of positive checks, the effect being opposite to the expected effect created by the 
mechanism of Malthusian stagnation. If the intensity of positive checks is small, the growth 
rate is also small but if the intensity of positive checks is large the growth rate is also large. 
Thus, empirical evidence indicates that Malthusian positive checks to not active the 
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mechanism of Malthusian stagnation but that they activate the mechanism of Malthusian 
regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013b), the mechanism that acts against 
the forces of positive checks and repairs quickly any damage caused by these forces. 
Empirical evidence contradicts the fundamental concept of the Epoch of Malthusian 
Stagnation, the first stage proposed by the Demographic Transition Theory, suggesting that 
Malthusian regeneration mechanism restores the process of growth to its original trajectory 
and prevents any form of stagnation.  
We have also pointed out that population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census 
Bureau, 2013) show that the growth rate in the distant past was small. Combining the two 
sources of information, the effect of positive checks expressed in increasing the growth rate 
and the evidence based on the population data showing that the growth rate was small, we 
have concluded (predicted) that demographic crises in the distant past were too weak to 
influence the growth of human population. We shall now check whether this prediction is 
confirmed by empirical evidence. 
Preliminary remarks 
Impacts of demographic catastrophes depend on their intensity (measured by the death toll), 
their duration and on the size of the affected population. However, even considering all these 
factors, impacts will not just depend on the number of people directly affected by a given 
crisis but more importantly on the number of people living in a certain country or a region 
where not all of the population was affected, and in the final analysis on the size of global 
population. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between local and global effects. Local 
death toll measured either in the number of killed people or as the percentage of the affected 
population may be high but it might not be high enough to affect significantly the growth of 
the world population or even the growth of regional population.  
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The death toll is usually given as the number of killed people and it is often impressively 
high. However, it is important to express it as the percentage of the population, because it is 
this number that can tell us whether demographic catastrophe was strong or weak, but even 
then, even if the percentage is high, it is important to distinguish between local effects and 
the effects embracing a significantly larger part of global or regional population.   
The further back in time we extend our investigation the less we know about the demographic 
catastrophes, their intensity and their possible impacts, but we have enough information about 
the AD era to find out whether positive checks were strong enough to affect the growth of 
human population. In order to understand human population dynamics it is essential to 
identify the main driving force, or forces, of growth. The fundamental question is whether 
random forces of positive checks proposed by Malthus (1798) were strong enough to interact 
substantially with the major driving force, either to suppress growth or to stimulate the 
recovery mechanism. Even though we do not have much information about demographic 
catastrophes during the BC era we might expect that if they had a substantial effect locally, 
because the size of human population was small in any place, and consequently the 
percentage of killed people might have been large, their general impact was probably small 
because people lived in greater isolation.  
 It should be also noted that the recorded impacts of demographic catastrophes are likely to be 
exaggerated. Recorded death rates “are largest when the supporting evidence is skimpiest. 
When data are better, the death rates are usually lower and the percentage increases less” 
(Watkins & Menken, 1985, p. 651). For instance, both Durand (1960) and Fitzgerald (1936, 
1947) claim that the impact of the An Lu-Shan Rebellion (AD 756-763) is probably 
exaggerated. Likewise, Russel (1968) and Twigg (1984) believe that the number of casualties 
caused by Justinian Plague (AD 541-542) is also grossly overestimated.  
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Another example is the Antonine Plague (AD 166-270), which was first estimated to have 
killed about 50% of the population of the Roman Empire (Seeck, 1910), but this estimate was 
later downgraded to 1-2%, or to the total number of casualties of 500,000-1,000,000 (Gilliam, 
1961) and eventually upgraded to 7-10% or to a maximum of 5 million (Littman & Littman, 
1973), the last estimate being still significantly smaller than the original estimate. It appears 
that the further back in time we go the larger is the possibility of exaggerated claims of the 
number of casualties.     
Fortunately, we have a sufficiently large number of reliable accounts for the AD era to study 
the effects of demographic catastrophes. Furthermore, exaggerated estimates are not going 
affect our investigation because, while keeping in mind the possibility of the overestimated 
death tolls, our aim is not to be biased towards accepting only small estimates in order to 
prove that impacts of demographic catastrophes were small but to include any large estimates 
and investigate also their impacts. Contradicting indications based on exaggerated estimates 
of death tolls but producing small effects will represent a strong argument in favour of our 
prediction that impacts of demographic catastrophes were small.  
We shall identify demographic catastrophes in the way they are reported in the literature. 
However, labelling them with just a single cause might not be accurate. For instance, a war 
considered as the main cause of a crisis might include famine but famine might be linked 
with pestilence. For example, during the Madras famine in the 1870s, about 40% of casualties 
were caused by smallpox and cholera (Lardinois, 1985). The Justinian Plague was 
accompanied by smallpox, diphtheria, cholera and influenza (Shrewsbury, 1970) and was 
“perhaps aided by wars, famines, floods and earthquakes” Scott and Duncan (2001, p. 5). 
Likewise, “a number of epidemics in France were preceded by famine, sometimes in 
conjunction with bad weather conditions” (Scott & Duncan, 2001, p. 105) whereas “frequent 
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and virulent outbreaks in France during 1520-1600 were accompanied by food shortages, 
famines, flooding, peasant uprisings and religious wars” (Scott & Duncan, 2001, p. 291). 
While drawing from primary sources about the frequency and intensity of demographic 
catastrophes, the presented survey has been also assisted by some useful compilations (Austin 
Alchon, 2003; Kohn, 1995; Spignesi, 2002; White, 2011).  
Survey of demographic catastrophes 
One of the earliest recorded plagues was the Asiatic disease identified now as tularaemia, a 
bacterial disease caused by Francisella tularensis, first transported to Egypt around the turn 
of the 18th century BC from the Middle East by contaminated ships (Trevisanato, 2004, 
2007). The same disease has been also probably recorded in the Bible as causing a great 
number of deaths among Philistines in the city of Ashdot, the event dated either to around 
1000 BC (Khan, 2004) or to 1320 BC (Cunha & Cunha, 2006).  
Early recorded plagues include also a viral haemorrhagic fever in Egypt between 1500-1350 
BC (Duncan & Scott, 2005) but it might have been the same disease as recorded earlier in 
Egypt and the same plague that decimated Philistines.  Incidentally, Duncan and Scott (2005) 
claim that the Black Death was not a bubonic plague caused by bacterium Yersinia pestis, as 
traditionally claimed, but rather that is was a viral haemorrhagic fever, which according to 
them includes also the plagues of Mesopotamia (700-350 BC), the Plague of Athens (430-427 
BC), the Plague of Justinian (AD 541-542), Plagues of Islam (AD 627-744), plagues in Asia 
minor (1345-1348), and the plague of Denmark and Sweden (1710-1711).  
The epidemic of Athens (460-399 BC) is claimed to have killed 25% of Athenian army and a 
great number of civilians (Austin Alchon, 2003). It created a turning point in the history of 
Greece (Ross, 2008). However, it is also claimed that this plague killed 50% of the army of 
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Pericles and 50% of the navy coming to the rescue from the Piraieus (Beran, 2008). The 
plague was triggered by overcrowding of Athens when Spartan’s attacks prompted rural 
population to seek shelter in that city, which was already housing a relatively large number of 
people, an estimated 300,000 citizens and around 3 million slaves.  
The earliest and the most lethal demographic catastrophes in the AD era was probably the 
Red Eyebrows Revolt commencing around AD 2. Durand (1960) lists the Chinese population 
as being 59.6 million in AD 2 and 21 million in AD 57, a total decline of 38.6 million in 55 
years, but according to him this decline was only partly caused by this rebellion (Durand, 
1960p. 216). However, he then discusses possible inaccuracies in these estimates and 
presents corrected numbers as being 74 million in AD 2 and 45 million in AD 88, for the 
entire Chinese Empire, a drop of 29 million in 86 years. He also estimates 71 million and 43 
million, respectively, for the China proper, representing a total drop of 28 million (Durand, 
1960, p. 221). By China proper he means the current 18 provinces. He uses this estimate in 
his graph (Durand, 1960, p. 247).  
Durand points out that estimates of the size of the population at the time of demographic 
catastrophes might be inaccurate. “Even if such huge loss were conceivable, it would be 
naïve to suppose that accurate count of the survivors could have been carried out in the midst 
of the ensuing chaos” (Durand, 1960, p. 224). White (2011) attributes only 10 million of 
casualties to the Red Eyebrows Revolt.  However, to estimate the maximum impact we shall 
accept the death toll of 29 million, and we shall attribute it entirely to the Red Eyebrows 
Revolt, keeping in mind that this figure might have been overestimated by the factor of three. 
The same applies to the An Lu-Shan Rebellion (AD 756-763). Records appear to show the 
death toll of 36 million but White (2011) attributes only 13 million. Here again, to lean in 
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favour of the concept of Malthusian Stagnation we shall assume 36 million casualties as 
suggested by the census rather than 13 million as assumed by White (2011).  
Between A.D. 705 and 755 to all appearances the census machinery functioned much 
more effectively; but after 755 it broke down again. The recorded number of persons 
dropped from nearly 53 millions in the year 755 to only 17 millions in 760. During this 
time China was torn by revolts which were suppressed with bloody force, including the 
notorious rebellion of An Lu-Shan. Many historians have affirmed that 36 million lives 
were lost as a result of these violent events, but Fitzgerald and others have shown that 
this is incredible (Durand, 1960, p. 223; Fitzgerald, 1936, 1947).  
The effect of the Plague of Justinian is hard to estimate because of confusing claims. The 
plague is claimed to have reduced the population of Constantinople by 40% between AD 541 
and 542 (Austin Alchon, 2003). However, Cunha and Cunha (2006) claim AD 542-590 for its 
duration and a 30% reduction of the population of the Roman Empire, or a maximum of 
about 14 million out of the total of 48 million  (Maddison, 2006; Seeck, 1921). “The plague 
so weakened the Roman Empire that not long after the plague had passed, Roman borders 
were overrun by Huns, Goths, Moors, and other ‘barbarians’” (Cunha & Cunha, 2006).  
It is claimed that in AD 549 the plague emerged in Britain (Carmichael, 2009) and in AD 
610, assisted by the Eurasian Silk Road, it spread to China (Ross, 2008) continuing its 
devastation until around AD 700 (Duncan & Scott, 2005) and killing probably a maximum of 
about 100 million people but over an unspecified time (Ross, 2008), making it difficult to 
calculate its impact. It is also claimed that “The Plague of Justinian recurred in discernible 
cycles of about nine to twelve years” (Dols, 1974, p. 373).  In order to estimate the maximum 
impact we shall assume that the total number of casualties was 25 million in a short time of 
only between AD 541 and 542 (Rosen, 2007). Had we used the suggestion of Cunha and 
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Cunha (2006) the estimated impact would have been much smaller because the number of 
claimed casualties was small and the death toll was spread over a much longer time.  
The Black Death (1343-1351) is claimed to have killed over 60% of the urban population in 
Asia, about 30% of the population of the Middle East and 30-60% of the population of 
Europe (Hawas, 2008). Beran (2008) claims that in many cities the death toll was over 90%, 
creating incredible hardship for the surviving few, adding perhaps to the death toll caused by 
the lack of food and safe shelter, let alone by complications created by decaying corpses. 
About 20% of the population of England died between AD 1348 and 1350 and a total of 50% 
by AD 1400 (Gilliam, 1961). Depending on the affected area, mortality rates varied between 
25% and 70% (Cunha & Cunha, 2006). The Black Death appears to have been the greatest 
demographic catastrophe ever recorded. 
If plagues were not powerful enough to kill large number of people, they were also used as 
biological weapons by employing a gruesome practice of catapulting infected corpses at the 
walls of fortifications or hurling them over the walls using trebuchets. This ghastly method 
was used by Greeks, Romans and other attackers between 300 BC and AD 1100, and by 
Tartars in 1346 against the residents of Genoa (Cunha & Cunha, 2006; Khan, 2004). 
Other examples of large local casualties caused by demographic catastrophes include 
smallpox in Japan (AD 812-814), killing about half of the population of that country (Austin 
Alchon, 2003); the 1696 famine killing between 25% and 30% of the population of Finland 
(Jutikkala, 1955); the 1770 famine in Bengal, killing  about 30% of the population (or a total 
of 10 million) and the 1376 famine in Italy, killing 60% of the population (Ghose 2002; Keys, 
Brozek, Henschel, Mickelsen  & Taylor, 1950; Walford, 1878).  
According to Mallory (1926), between AD 620 and 1619, 18 provinces of China experienced 
1015 draughts, or about one per year. However, they were unevenly distributed, illustrating 
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that while the number of casualties and impacts of demographic catastrophes might be high in 
a small and strongly-affected regions, the effects could be much less severe when averaged 
over a larger number of human population.  
There was a total of 443 draughts in the Northern Division, 352 in the Central Division and 
220 in the Southern Division. However, even within the same division, the number of 
draughts varied significantly between various districts. For instance, in the Northern Division, 
Honan District experienced a total of 112 draughts but Kansu Division only 4. In the Central 
Division, the largest number of draughts (113) was in the Chekiang District and the smallest 
(28) in the Anhwei District. In the Southern Division the number of draughts varied between 
4 and 59 per district.  
The list of significant lethal events in China includes: 60-70% of troops killed during a single 
military engagement in AD 16; 70% of Mongolians killed by hunger in AD 46; 30-40% of 
troops killed in AD 162; about 70% of troops killed in a single military engagement and by 
famine and epidemic; close to 100% killed by locusts and famine in AD 312 in the northern 
and central China; over 30% killed in Shantung in AD 762; over 50% in Chekiang in AD 
806; 30-40% in Hupeh, Kinagsu and Anhui in  AD 891; 90% in Hopei in  1331; 50% of 
troops between  1351-1352; over 70% in Shansi in AD 135; 60-70% in Hupeh in   1354, and 
100% in various towns and villages in Hunan in  1484 (McNeill, 1976; see also Austin 
Alchon, 2003)  
It is claimed that in Mexico, 25-50% of the population died of smallpox (1520-1521), 60-
90% probably of typhus (1531-1532), and over 50% of either the bubonic plague or typhus 
between 1576 and 1581 (Austin Alchon, 2003; Motolinía aka Fray Toribio de Benavente o 
Motolinía, 1971; del Paso y Troncoso, 1940; Prem, 1992).  
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The estimated death toll in the Andes between 1524 and 1591 include 30-50% of smallpox 
(1524-1527), 25-30% of measles or bubonic plague (1531-1533), 15-20% of influenza, 
measles and smallpox (1558-1559), and about 50% of influenza, measles, smallpox and 
typhus between 1585 and 1591 (Cook, 1981; Dobyns, 1963). Dobyns (1993) gives also many 
examples of large death tolls, sometimes as high as 98% but most often close to 80-90%, 
caused by diseases among Native American population.  
So, it appears that humans always lived with the threats and deadly effects of demographic 
catastrophes strong enough to reduce often substantially the size of local populations, the 
severity and frequency of these events appearing to be in support of the Demographic 
Transition Theory and of the idea of the prolonged Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, if we 
still want to insist that the mechanism of Malthusian stagnation was active. We have already 
shown that this mechanism is not active now and probably was never active because 
empirical evidence suggests that positive checks activate the efficient Malthusian 
regeneration mechanism (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013a, 2013b).  
However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the mechanism of Malthusian 
stagnation was active in the past. The question now is whether demographic crises were 
strong enough to affect the growth of human population. More specifically, if we still want to 
assume that positive checks activate the Malthusian stagnation mechanism rather than the 
Malthusian replacement mechanism, the question is whether these apparently strong and 
frequent critical events occurring in various parts of the world had a significantly strong 
influence on the growth of global population, the influence, which might have been reflected 
in stagnation, Malthusian oscillations and fluctuations, or whether the effects were not strong 
enough to interfere with a perhaps much stronger and dominating driving force of growth. 
The question is also whether these opposing forces of critical events were even strong enough 
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to influence the regional growth of the population over a significantly long time. This last 
question is not investigated in this article but is addresses in the forthcoming book mentioned 
in the footnote to the Introduction.  
Impacts of demographic catastrophes 
Results of the survey of demographic catastrophes are presented in Table 1. The Epoch of 
Malthusian Stagnation is claimed to have “persisted until the end of the 18th century” (Galor, 
2005a, p. 180). Consequently, the results of the survey extend to around 1900 to allow for 
about 100-year overlap between the alleged end of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation and 
the claimed new regime of growth. The BC era is not included because we do not have 
enough reliable information about that time, but the survey for the AD era should be 
sufficient to assess the reliability of the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. 
In this table, impacts of demographic catastrophes are measured by (1) the number of killed 
people, (2) the duration of crisis, (3) the total percentage of the population killed during the 
entire time of crisis (total impact), and (4) by the percentage of the population killed per 
year. Other gauge indicators can be also introduced. They are discussed in the forthcoming 
book. 
The most remarkable and unexpected result of this survey is that impacts of demographic 
crises were in general surprisingly small. Total impacts of up to around 10% can be ignored 
because such occasional deviations are too small to be reflected in the growth trajectory. 
Even occasional displacement as large as 20% is unlikely to affect significantly the overall 
trend. Our survey shows that 84% of the major demographic catastrophes were characterised 
by the total impact of less than 5%, and 48% by the total impact of less than 1%. It should be 
also mentioned that Table 1 lists only large catastrophes associated with total death tolls of 
1,000,000 or larger. Had we listed all reported catastrophes, the percentage of demographic 
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crises having negligible impacts on the growth of human population would have been even 
larger, or alternatively the percentage of significant demographic crises would have been 
negligibly small. 
Table 1. Demographic catastrophes and their impacts 
Event Onset 
(AD) 






Red Eyebrows Revolt 2 29,000,000 87 11.5 0.13 
Antonine Plague 166 5,000,000 15 2.2 0.15 
Plague of Justinian  541 25,000,000 2 12.5 6.23 
An Lu-Shan Rebellion 756 36,000,000 8 15.4 1.93 
N. Egypt Earthquake 1201 1,500,000 1 0.5 0.46 
Mongolian Conquest 1260 40,000,000 35 11.3 0.32 
Great European Famine 1315 7,500,000 3 2.0 0.68 
Famine in China 1333 9,000,000 15 2.4 0.16 
Black Death 1343 75,000,000, 9 19.7 2.19 
Fall of the Yuan Dynasty 1351 7,500,000 18 1.9 0.11 
Sweating Sickness 1485 3,000,000 67 0.6 0.01 
Mexico Smallpox Epidemic 1520 4,000,000 2 0.8 0.42 
French Wars of Religion 1562 3,000,000 37 0.6 0.02 
Russia’s Time of Trouble 1598 5,000,000 16 0.9 0.06 
Fall of the Ming Dynasty 1618 25,000,000 27 4.3 0.16 
Thirty Years War 1618 7,000,000 31 1.2 0.04 
Deccan Famine in India 1630 2,000,000 2 0.3 0.17 
Famine in France 1693 2,000,000 2 0.3 0.15 
Bengal Famine 1769 10,000,000 5 1.2 0.23 
Napoleonic Wars  1803 4,000,000 13 0.4 0.03 
Famines in China 1810 22,500,000 2 2.3 1.13 
Great Irish Famine 1845 1,000,000 6 0.1 0.01 
Famine in China 1846 11,300,000 1 1.0 0.96 
Taiping Rebellion 1850 20,000,000 15 1.6 0.11 
Famine in India 1866 1,000,000 1 0.1 0.08 
Famine in Rajputana 1869 1,500,000 1 0.1 0.11 
Famine in Persia 1870 2,000,000 2 0.1 0.07 
Famine in N. China  1876 13,000,000 3 0.9 0.31 
British India Famine 1876 17,000,000 25 1.1 0.05 
Yellow River Flood 1887 2,000,000 1 0.1 0.13 




There were only two catastrophes that might have caused a temporary distortion in the growth 
of human population: the An Lu-Shan Rebellion with its maximum estimated total impact of 
15.4% and the Black Death with its estimated impact of 19.7%. Two outstanding but 
moderate demographic catastrophes could not have had a strong influence on the growth of 
human population even if we assume that the mechanism of Malthusian was active. If, 
however, as suggested by empirical evidence, the Malthusian regeneration mechanism was 
active, even large losses would have been quickly replaced and the damage repaired. We 
should also remember that we have listed the estimated maximum impacts. The actual 
impacts could have been smaller.      
In estimating impacts of demographic crises, we should also consider overlapping or closely-
spaced catastrophes. A single catastrophe might be too weak to cause any significant damage, 
but if combined with closely-spaced catastrophes, their collective impact could be large. The 
survey shows only one such significant cluster of events: Mongolian Conquest  with the total 
estimated death toll of 40 million; the Great European Famine, 7.5 million; the 15-year 
Famine in China, 9 million; Black Death, 25 million; and the Fall of Yuan Dynasty, 7.5 
million.  However, Black Death has been already identified as possibly having a noticeable 
effect, which means again that out of all catastrophic events only two might have been strong 
enough to cause any tangible distortion in the population trajectory: the An Lu-Shan 
Rebellion and the combination of five closely-spaced catastrophes. All other catastrophes had 
negligible effect on the growth of human population.     
Summary and conclusions 
One might expect that many demographic catastrophes were not duly recorded, but the results 
of this survey show that the overwhelming majority of recorded catastrophic events were too 
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weak to have any effect on the growth of human population. This conclusion contradicts the 
postulate of the existence of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, the first stage of growth 
proposed by the Demographic Transition Theory, even if, contrary to the empirical evidence, 
we still assume that the mechanism of stagnation rather than the mechanism of regeneration 
was active.  
As pointed out earlier (Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013b) the mechanism of regeneration was 
first suggested by Malthus (1978) and confirmed empirically by the study of the dependence 
of the growth rate on the level of deprivation (Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013a), the study based 
on one of many sets of data, which were not available to Malthus. Considering the strongly 
limited information available to him, he must have been endowed with the exceptional power 
of observation and foresight, surpassing the power of observation of many who tried to 
follow his footsteps and yet failed to notice the multitude of empirical evidence pointing to 
the correct understanding of the human population dynamics.     
Results of this survey show that demographic crises were so weak that even if they activated 
the Malthusian regeneration mechanism, any damage caused by them was quickly and 
efficiently repaired, which leads us to yet another conclusion (expectation) that global or 
even perhaps regional trajectories of growth of human population will not show any major 
disturbances. Population growth trajectories should display robust and stable characteristics.    
The major points of our investigation can be summarised as follows: 
1. Empirical evidence (Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013a) suggests that positive checks do 
not suppress the growth of human population but activate an efficient regeneration 
mechanism (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen aka Nurzynski, 2013b). 
2. There was only one combination of five closely-spaced demographic catastrophes 
(Mongolian Conquest, Great European Famine, the 15-year Famine in China, Black 
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Death, and the Fall of Yuan Dynasty) that may have had a small effect on the growth 
of human population. Another possibly strong effect might have been produced by 
the An Lu-Shan Rebellion, but the death toll associated with this event is almost 
certainly overestimated (Durand, 1960; Fitzgerald, 1936, 1947). 
3. Demographic catastrophes (positive checks) were too weak to alter the course of the 
growth of human population.  
4. Demographic crises were so weak that the Malthusian regeneration mechanism, if 
activated, was able to repair any damage quickly and efficiently. 
5. The growth of human population must have been controlled by a yet to be identified 
strong driving force.   
References 
Austin Alchon, S. (2003). A pest in the land: new world epidemics in a global perspective. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
Beran, G. W. (2008). Disease and density – mystery and mastery. Preventive Veterinary 
Disease, 86, 198-207. 
Carmichael, A. G. (2009). Plague, historical. In M. Schaechter (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Microbiology (3rd ed., pp. 58-72). San Diego, CA: San Diego University. 
Cook, N. D. (1981). Demographic collapse, Indian Peru, 1520-1620. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Cunha, C. B., & Cunha, B. A. (2006). Impact of plague on human history. Infectious Disease 
Clinics of North America, 20, 253-272. 
16 
 
del Paso y Troncoso, F. (1940). Epistolario de Nueva Espana, 1505-1818. Mexico: Antigua 
Libreria Robredo.  
Dobyns, H. F. (1963). An outline of Andean epidemic history to 1720. Bulletin of the History 
of Medicine, 37, 493-515. 
Dobyns, H. F. (1993). Disease transfer at contact. Annual Review of Anthropology, 22(1), 
273-291. 
Dols, M. W. (1974). Plague in early Islamic history. Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 94 (3), 371–83. 
Duncan, C., & Scott, S. (2005). What caused the Black Death? Postgrad Medical Journal, 
81, 315-320. 
Durand, J. D. (1960). The population statistics of China. Population Studies, 13(3), 209-256. 
Fitzgerald, C. P. (1936). Further historical evidence of the growth of Chinese population. 
Sociological Review, 28, 267-273. 
Fitzgerald, C. P. (1947). The consequences of the rebellion of An Lu-shan upon the 
population of the T'ang Dynasty. Philobiblon, 2(1), 4-11.  
Ghose, A. K. (2002). Food supply and starvation: A study of famines with reference to the 
Indian continent. Oxford Economic Papers 34, 368-389. 
Gilliam, J. F. (1961). The plague under Marcus Aurelius. The American Journal of Philology, 
82(3), 225-251. 
Hawas, T. (2008). Anthropode-borne disease. In B. W. Lerner & K. L. Lerner (Eds.), 
Infectious diseases: In context (pp. 63-66). Detroit: Gale Carnegie Learning.   
17 
 
Jutikkala, E. (1955). The great Finish famine 1696-97. Scand. Econ. Hist. Rev., 3, 48-63. 
Keys, A., Brozek, J., Henschel, A., Mickelsen, O., & Taylor, H. L. (1950). The biology of 
human starvation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Khan, I. A. (2004). Plague: the dreadful visitation occupying the human mind for centuries.  
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 98, 270-277. 
Kohn, G. C. (1995). The Wordsworth encyclopedia of plague and pestilence. New York: 
Facts on File.  
Lardinois, R. (1985). Famine, epidemics and mortality in South India: A reappraisal of the 
demographic crisis of 1876-78. Economic and Political Weekly, 20(11), 454- 465. 
Littman, R. J., & Littman, M. L. (1973). Galen and the Antonine Plague. The American 
Journal of Philology, 94(1), 243-255. 
Maddison, A. (2006). The World Economy. Paris: OECD. 
Maddison, A. (2010). Historical statistics of the world economy: 1-2008 AD. 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical Statistics/horizontal-file_02-2010.xls 
Mallory, W. H. (1926). China: Land of famine. New York: American Geographical Society. 
Malthus, T. R. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future 
Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr Godwin, M. 
Condorcet, and Other Writers. London: J. Johnson. 
Manning, S. (2008). Year-by-Year World Population Estimates: 10,000 B.C. to 2007 A.D. 
http://www.digitalsurvivors.com/archives/worldpopulation.php  and references therein. 
McNeill, W. H. (1976). Plagues and people. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 
18 
 
Motolinía aka Fray Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía (1971). Memoriales; o, Libro de las 
cosas de la Nueva Espana y de los naturales de ella. Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico. 
Nielsen, R. W. aka Nurzynski, J. (2013a). Malthusian stagnation or Malthusian regeneration. 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1310/1310.5390.pdf 
Nielsen, R. W. aka Nurzynski, J. (2013b). Scientifically unacceptable concept of the Epoch of 
Malthusian Stagnation. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1310/1310.4258.pdf 
Prem, H. J. (1992). Disease Outbreaks in Central Mexico during the Sixteenth Century. In N. 
D. Cook & W. G. Lowell (Eds.), Secret Judgments of God: Old World Disease in 
Colonial Spanish America, pp. 20-48. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.  
Ross, M. E. (2008). Plague, early history. In B. W. Lerner & K. L. Lerner (Eds.), Infectious 
Diseases: In Context (pp. 627-634). Detroit: Gale Carnegie Learning.   
Russel, J. C. (1968). That earlier plague. Demography, 5, 174-184. 
Scott, S., & Duncan, C. J. (2001). Biology of plagues: Evidence from historical populations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Seeck, O. (1921). Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche 
verlag. 
Shrewsbury, J. F. D. (1970). A History of Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Spignesi, S. J. 2002, Catastrophe! The 100 greatest disasters of all time. New York: 
Kensington Publishing Corp. 
19 
 
Trevisanato, S. I. (2004). Did the epidemic of tularemia in Ancient Egypt affect the course of 
world history? Medical Hypotheses, 63, 905-910. 
Trevisanato, S. I. (2007). The biblical plague of the Philistines now has the name, tularaemia. 
Medical Hypotheses, 69, 1144-1146. 
Twigg, G. (1984). The Black Death: A biological reprisal. London: Batsford Academic.  
US Census Bureau (2013). International Data Base. 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.php and references therein. 
Walford, C. (1878). On the famines of the world: Past and present. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, 41, 433-535. 
Wang, C. (2005). Institutions, demographic transition, and Industrial Revolution: A unified 
theory. SSRN Working Paper Series, 08/2005. 
Watkins, S. C., & Menken, J. (1985). Famines in historical perspective. Population and 
Development Review, 11, 647-676. 
White, M. (2011). The great big book of horrible things: The definite chronicle of history’s 
100 worst atrocities. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.   
